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RONALD G. CUMMINGS*

Legal and Administrative Uses of
Economic Paradigms: A Critique'
1. INTRODUCTION

Goals related to the economic and social welfare of people have always
been basic to the ends sought in water resources development and administration. Over the last two to three decades, growing water scarcity in
many parts of the world has led to competition for water resources between
different groups of people as each group of people sees their economic
and social goals threatened by water scarcity. This competition for water
has introduced to water administrators and legal scholars a broad set of
challenges. In the United States, the surge in interstate and intrastate
litigation concerning rights to water resources presents legal scholars with
the challenge of sweeping changes in water law. Water administrators are
faced with the challenges imposed by growing demands for better and
more efficient means for developing and managing water resources.
As the judiciary, legislators, and administrators strive to meet the contemporary management challenges associated with water scarcity, reference is increasingly made to economic paradigms as a source of guidance
for analyzing efficient rules related to the allocation of scarce resources.
In many ways, this development may be viewed as a healthy one. Economic principles, along with those of hydrology, engineering, law, and
public administration (to name but a few relevant disciplines), have their
appropriate uses in the development of sensible strategies for water resources development and management. There is a basis for concern,
however, with the all too frequent instances where economic paradigms
are used uncritically and are accepted (particularly by the courts) as
offering objective measures for social and economic effects of alternative
water allocation schemes. As is demonstrated below, such uncritical use
of economic paradigms can, at best, mislead legal and management scholars and, at worst, result in decisions which are later found to distort the
ends sought by them.
Thus, concern in this paper is focused upon the pitfalls of the uncritical
*Professor of Economics, University of New Mexico.
I. This paper draws heavily upon a paper entitled Economic Aspects of Water Resources Administration: The Pitfalls of "Bad" Economics and "Bad" Law presented by the author at the Third
World Conference on Water Law and Administration, Alicante, Spain, December 11-14, 1989. The
author gratefully acknowledges comments on earlier drafts of the paper by Susan Chris Nunn and
H.S. Burness, both with the University of New Mexico.
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use of basic economic paradigms. The common theme which will run
through these discussions will be the question: How can "bad" use of
economics lead to "bad" law? This theme is developed with the use of
two case studies involving cases wherein the Congress and the courts
have seemingly imputed to economic paradigms-principally the market
paradigm 2-a level of objectivity which simply does not exist. Put another
way, these entities, in their use of economic paradigms, have failed to
appreciate the assumptions underlying the paradigm, and these assumptions have many times involved the very equity issues at issue before
them. In such cases, the economic "model" used included assumptions
which effectively preempted the role of Congress or the court's role in
addressing an equity issue.
To these ends, a case study involving the condemnation of land by the
U.S. government is examined in section 2. The use and misuse of discounting procedures in adjudications of water rights is discussed in section
3. Concluding remarks are offered in section 4.
2. THE MARKET PARADIGM, FAIR MARKET VALUE,
AND JUST COMPENSATION 3
The first case study to be considered centers upon a quandary faced
by the U.S. Congress in the late 1940s to early 1950s. This historical
example has contemporary relevance inasmuch as a Special Commission
created by the Secretary of the Interior in 1985 has been considering
means by which the problems created by earlier Congressional actions
might be ameliorated. At issue was the U.S. government's condemnation
of 156,035 acres of land from the Three Affiliated Tribes (hereinafter
"Tribes") that reside on the Ft. Berthold reservation.' The reservation is
located in the northern part of the State of North Dakota. The condemned
lands were to be flooded as a result of the federal government's construction of the Garrison Dam, authorized by the Flood Control Act of 1944.6
2. The market paradigm is also referred to as the model of a perfectly competitive market. For
a detailed discussion of this paradigm, and its implications for the assessment of water markets, see
Brajer, Church, Cummings, & Farah, The Strengthsand Weaknesses of WaterMarkets as They Affect
Water Scarcity and Sovereignty Interests in the West, 29 Nat. Res. J., 489 (1989).
3. This section draws from work conducted by the author for the Legal Division of the Three
Affiliated Tribes at Ft. Berthold (Newtown), N.D.; see R. Cummings, Valuing the Resource Base
Lost by the Three Affiliated Tribes as a Result of Lands Taken from Them for the Garrison Project
(Legal Department, Three Affiliated Tribes, February, 1986). The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the support of this work by the Legal Division.
4. Garrison Unit Joint Tribal Advisory Committee, established by the Honorable Donald Hodel,
Secretary of the Interior, May 10, 1985. See Final Report: The Garrison Unit Joint Tribal Advisory
Committee, Ft. Berthold Reservation and Standing Rock Sioux, Report to the Secretary of the
Interior (May 23, 1986.
5. See 59 Stat. 654 (1945); 60 Stat. 167, §6 (1946); and Pub. L. No. 63-236, Ch. 790, § 12
(1949).
6. Pub. L. No. 58-534 (1944).
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For later purposes, it is important that one understand that the taken lands
included virtually all of the Tribes' arable lands-lands amenable to irrigated agriculture and forestry.7
The Indians were paid $12.5 million as "just compensation" for the
condemned lands.8 For readers to whom "just compensation" is not a
term of art, a bit of clarification may be useful. The Fifth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. 9 While early judicial efforts to
give substance to the "just compensation" requirement were somewhat
demanding, requiring a "full and perfect equivalent" for the property
taken,' o the "full and perfect equivalent" criterion was soon refined to
require that "[the owner] is entitled to be put in as good a position
pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. He must be made whole
but is not entitled to more."" The measure which is generally accepted
by the courts as one which would satisfy the "make whole" criterion is
the market price of the property in question.' 2
Central to the theme of this section is the manner in which the U.S.
Supreme Court has effectively equated equity, or fairness, with market
prices. This acceptance is seen in a 1943 decision of the Court:
The owner [of condemned property] has been said to be entitled to
the 'value', the 'market value' and the 'fair market value' of what
is taken. The term 'fair' hardly adds anything to the phrase 'market
value', which denoted-what 'it fairly may be believed that a purchaser
in fair market conditions would have given' or, more concisely,
'market value'fairly determined'.. . .3
The $12.5 million awarded to the Indians by Congress was based upon
the then prevailing market value of land in North Dakota. 4 The criteria
for the Fifth Amendment requirement of just compensation were then
considered to have been satisfied.'" However, there was in 1950, and
continues to be today, the feeling by many that just compensation was
not achieved by the $12.5 million paid the Tribes for their taken lands.
7. See Meyer, Fort Berthold and the Garrison Dam, 35 N.D. Hist. 3-4 (Summer/Fall, 1968).
8. 63 Stat. 790, §2 (1949).
9. U.S. Cont., amend. V.
10. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
11. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (emphasis added). See also, United States
v. New River Collieries Co. 262 U.S. 341, 345 (1923).
12. Id. Criteria applicable for cases where market prices are not available are seen, for example,
in United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949); and
United States v. Chester Fuller, 409 U.S. 801, 803 (1973).
13. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
14. See C. Hobbs and R. Martin, Schedule of Appraisals of Indian Property to be Flooded in
Connectionwith GarrisonDam Project,Schedule E, in Briefing Book: The Fort Berthold Reservation
Mineral Restoration Act (1984).
15. 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Cong. Rec. H., 15051 (Oct. 19, 1949).
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A number of Congressmen 6 were moved to argue that "something" was
wrong with the government's settlement with the Tribes-the "fair market" settlement did not leave the Indians "whole." However, concerned
Congressmen were unable to do more than assert that the compensation
was not "moral." They could not articulate precisely why they believed
fair market value failed to provide just compensation in this case.' 7 Observations of economic conditions on the reservation before and after the
condemnation tend to lend empirical support to the argument that something was wrong with the settlement.'" The Fort Berthold Indians were
economically self-sufficient prior to the condemnation; following the condemnation, notwithstanding receipt of market values for the taken lands,
the Indians have become almost totally dependent, economically, upon
financial support from the U.S. government.' 9
The failure of market value to provide compensation which squared
with the equity ends mandated by the Fifth Amendment and which was
sought by the Congress in this case can be attributed directly to two
distinct failures of the market paradigm as it was applied to this particular
condemnation case. Among the fundamental assumptions which underlie
this paradigm are: 1) the market has many buyers and sellers, all of whom
have perfect information, and of primary interest here, 2) all factors of
production are perfectly mobile.' The critical feature of the "perfect
mobility" assumption is that none of the factors, particularly labor (people, families), are assumed to have impediments to their movement to
the highest valued opportunities. 2'
The first failure of the market paradigm in maintaining the rationale
for equating market price with just compensation is reasonably straightforward. Given the perfect mobility assumed in the market paradigm,
workers are perfectly mobile, and resources (such as land, or water) in
one location are substitutable as an economic base for those located in
any other location. A market price for the resource at location A is the
capitalized value of returns (profits) to the resource owner at location A,
and should therefore be adequate to purchase resources at any other
location B whose profit-related characteristics are roughly the same as at
location A. Incomes (wages) to workers are not included in the capitalized
16. See comments of Representatives Lemke, D'Ewart, and Morris in 80th Cong., Ist Sess.,
Cong. Rec. H., 15049-15052(Oct. 19, 1949).
17. Id.
18. R. Cummings, supra note 3.
19. Id.
20. Factors of production include: land, capital, and of particular importance here, labor. Brajer,
Church, Cummings & Farah, supra note 2.
21. "'Perfectly competitive markets are characterized by... firms and resources are freely mobile,
with no obstacles, such as patents or licenses, to prevent new firms from entering or existing firms
from leaving the industry." W. McEachem, Economics: A Contemporary Introduction 525 (2nd ed.
1991).
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value which determines the market price.' Such incomes are costs to the
resource owner. With the sale of the resource at location A, mobile
workers will simply move to jobs at other locations.
In the case of the Indians, however, neither the Tribes as the resource
owners, nor the individual Tribal members as the workers, are mobile.
For example, they cannot move from North Dakota to Florida to obtain
equally productive land at prices received for land in North Dakota, nor
would they reasonably be expected to by treaty.' Recalling that the taken
lands included virtually all of the Tribes' arable lands, such land served
as a unique economic base for the generation of incomes. The value of
the land to the Tribes then includes all incomes earned by workers. This
follows from the fact that, absent the resource, workers have no alternative
employment. The "price," or value, of land in this instance is the capitalized value of all incomes-wages to workers plus profits-generated
from the resource.
Thus, the market paradigm describes conditions under which exchanges
take place between many willing buyers and sellers, all of whom are
perfectly mobile.24 Under such a paradigm, values derived from such
arms-length transactions could reasonably be expected to "make whole"
the participants in any exchange. It then follows that if one is to use this
paradigm as a rationale for equating market prices with "fair" or just
compensation to unwilling sellers whose resources are taken by condemnation, one must require the existence of the conditions assumed by the
paradigm. Of course, herein lies the problem in cases involving the
condemnation of reservation lands. Absent an abrogation of treaty, it will
generally be the case that a condition which is critical to the market
paradigm is missing in such cases: labor resources will not be mobile.
The logic of value structures drawn from the market paradigm is therefore
not applicable to value structures for tribal resources. One must then
conclude that the rationale for equating market price with just compensation in the "make whole" sense set out by the Court is substantively
flawed when applied to these resources.
The substance of a second related failure of the market paradigm as a
rationale for equating market price with "just compensation" is given
context by the following analysis. The Indians wish to stay together as
22. To be precise, this capitalized value determines the supply price of the resource and, at the
margin, this supply price equals the demand price. The capitalized value is the "present discounted
value" of an asset with infinite life. See W. Nicholson, Microeconomic Theory 702-703 (4th ed.
1989).
23. [[T]his Reservation is formed] ... in order to obtain the means necessary to enable them
[the Tribes] to become wholly self supporting by the cultivation of the soil and other pursuits of
husbandry.... Preamble for the Treaty of March 3, 1891, 51st Cong., 1 th Sess., Ch. 543, 26
Stat. 1032 (1891), Agreement with Indians on Ft. Berthold Agency.
24. W. McEachern, supra note 21.
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a Tribe and must earn their living on the reservation. Since they were
paid "fair market value" for their condemned lands, and land is important
to their ability to generate incomes, could they simply have gone below
the dam site and bought 156,035 acres of similar land to replace the
condemned lands? Is this not what "fair" market value means?
Here again the issue of mobility is of central importance. Basic to the
market paradigm is the assumption that factor markets are at an equilibrium across markets.' If the market price for a particular quality of land
in area A is substantively higher than in area B, mobile buyers will move
from area A to area B until market prices in the two areas are roughly
the same.26 Within this context, consider the situation faced by the Tribes.
Between 1950 and 1955, the amount of farm land bought and sold each
year in the Tribe's area of interest was some 35,100 acres;27 thus, market
prices for farm lands were based upon this level of transactions. It is
surely obvious that had the Indians attempted to purchase 156,035 acres
of land in this market-increasing the "normal" demand for farm land
some five times-farm land prices would have become highly inflated.
An immobile Indian population cannot relocate to distant regions or states
in which land might be obtained at prices which they received for their
condemned lands. Therefore, the paradigm of competitive markets does
not apply. In terms of purchasing land in the market, the immobile Indians
would essentially be hostage to a very limited number of potential sellers
of land in the area adjacent or in close proximity to the reservation. The
paradigm of monopoly markets" would then more closely describe the
conditions faced by the Tribes. Pre-condemnation competitive prices would
then necessarily be much lower than post-condemnation monopoly prices.
Pre-condemnation prices for land could not possibly leave the Tribes
"whole" when remaining whole would require purchasing land at postcondemnation prices.
These discussions make the case that "bad" economics in some classes
of condemnation proceedings can result from a lack of understanding of
the conditions requisite for an operable, competitive market, particularly
from a lack of understanding of the requirement of perfect mobility. In
the specific case of the Ft. Berthold reservation, "bad" economics resulted
in "bad" law. This "bad" law was legislation which awarded compensation that demonstrably fails the judicially established criteria for just
25. Factors of production include land, labor and capital. Factor markets are markets in which
these factors of production are bought and sold. Equilibrium in these markets occur when prices are
such that the quantity of a factor offered for sale equals the quantity of the factor which is demanded.
See W. McEachern, supra note 21 at chs. 25 and 26.
26. Id.
27. R. Cummings, supra note 3. This area would include Oliver and Mercer counties.
28. A monopoly market is a market with but one seller of a good or a factor of production. See
W. McEachem, supra note 21 at ch. 22.
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compensation. Pre-condemnation market prices would surely have been
inadequate to cover the replacement of lands at post-condemnation market
prices. More to the point, any market price, determined by capitalized
profits alone, would fail the "make whole" criterion forjust compensation
when both resource owners and workers are immobile.
3. THE SOCIAL TIME PREFERENCE PARADIGM AND
THE DISCOUNT RATE 29
The second case study to be examined involves discounting procedures
used in benefit-cost studies.30 The context for this case study is the adjudication of water rights reserved to Indian reservations in the United
States which have been ongoing over the last three or four decades. The
basis of these adjudications is the 1908 U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Winters v. United States.3 In Winters, the Court determined that, by
establishing treaties with the various Indian tribes, Congress intended to
reserve to the32Tribes the rights to resources required to fulfill the purposes
of the treaty.
In 1963 in Arizona v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
the amount of water reserved to the Indians under the Winters rule was
subject to a limit. 33 This limit is the amount of water which a Tribe can
demonstrably put to use, presently and in the future, for "practicably
irrigable acreage." A Special Master for the Court heard arguments in a
reopening of Arizona v. Californiafor the purpose of adjudicating reserved
rights in boundary lands, and ruled that: "for present purposes, a finding
that annual benefits exceed costs will suffice for a finding of practicable
irrigability.'34 While the Master's report was later set aside by the Court,
the Court's position in terms of the use of benefit-cost measures as a
demonstration of "practicably irrigable acreage" remains an open question.35
The use of "economic feasibility" as a demonstration that water could
be "practically" put to use in future years might appear on its face to be
29. Social time preference refers to society's preference between consumption of goods and
services "today" and in future periods, typically expressed as a rate. A discount rate is akin to a
rate of interest; a discount rate is used to adjust future values to current values. A social discount
rate is the discount rate used to discount future values by society as represented by the federal
government. See 0. Herfindahl & A. Kneese, Economic Theory of Natural Resources, ch. 5 (1974).
A. Dasgupta & D. Pearce, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Theory and Practice, ch. 6 (1978).
30. See A. Dasgupta & D. Pearce, supra note 29.
31. 207 U.S. 564 (1907).
32. Id. •
33. 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1962).
34. Moreover, "Practicably irrigable ... very nearly means economically feasible." Report of
E. Tuttle, Special Master, at 94. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 601.
35. In this regard, see a discussion of the divided opinion of the Court concerning the Big Horn
River Adjudication reported in 3 Water Strategist (October, 1989).
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reasonable. As such, at issue would be the comparison of a discounted
flow of future benefits with a discounted flow of future costs, or equivalently in some instances, the comparison of annualized benefits with
annualized costs. Following typical practice in benefit-cost analysis, let
annual benefits which would derive from the development of water resources be fixed at $B; let project costs be measured by $C. The economic
feasibility test would then involve the following comparison. Define CRF
as the capital recovery factor used for determining annualized values,36
r as the discount rate, and t as the useful life of the water project. Compare
$B with $C[CRF], CRF = [r/(1 - {1 + r}-)]. If $B is at least as great
as $C[CRF], the posited present and future use of the water is economically feasible, and if $B is less than $C[CRF], it is not. Obviously, one's
choice for r for the purposes of this comparison is important. The weight
given costs, the CRF, is.101 if r is ten percent, .063 if r is six percent,
and .032 if r is two percent.37 If development costs are $200 million,
feasibility would then require that benefits be at least as great as $20.2
million, $12.6 million, or $6.4 million, if the value of r is taken to be
ten percent, six percent, or two percent, respectively.
We may then ask: What is this "discount rate?" Continuing the general
theme of this paper, this is to inquire, first, as to the character of the
economic paradigm relevant for a discount rate, as well as for one's
choice of a value for r. Second, we inquire as to the extent to which
alternative uses of this paradigm square with the Supreme Court's concern
with intergenerational equity for affected Indian reservations. We begin
with a focus on the paradigms relevant for discounting.
While there are a number of paradigms which argue a rationale for a
discount rate," and still more which argue how a discount rate should
be chosen,39 the paradigm which would seem to be most appropriate for
benefit-cost analyses would arguably be that related to "social time preference. "' Social time preference refers to society's preference between
present and future consumption, where such preference is stated as a rate.
Thus, if we know that it would require $110 of goods and services
available for consumption in the future to compensate society for giving
up $100 in consumption "today," a discount rate based upon social time
preference would be taken to be ten percent.
In terms of choosing a discount rate, the social time preference paradigm would have us look to opportunity costs associated with any given
investment. What consumption opportunities must society give up today
36. A. Dasgupta & D. Pearce, supra note 29, at 168.
37. Assumes t = 50 years.
38. As but a few examples, see generally R. Lind, Discounting for Time and Risk In Energy
Policy, (1982), and C. Howe, Natural Resource Economics, ch. 8 (1979).
39. Id.
40. Supra note 29.

Winter 19911

ECONOMIC PARADIGMS

if scarce funds are to be used, for example, to finance a water project,
and how does society value those foregone opportunities? As one might
expect, there is little consensus among economists, or indeed, government
agencies, as to how one measures "how much is given up" or "how does
society value what is given up. "4 To provide the reader with just a taste
for this lack of consensus it is sufficient to note that the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget has, for the last 17 years, used a ten percent
discount rate;42 the Government Accounting Office uses discount rates
based upon the Treasury borrowing rate-usually, the average nominal
yield on treasury debt with maturity between one year and the number
of years in the life of the project under analysis;4 and the Congressional
Budget Office is using a two percent rate as a real, inflation free, discount
rate." Most importantly for the arguments of this paper, the discount rate
which agencies of the federal government involved in land and water
reclamation projects are required to use is mandated by law: the average
rate of return on long-term government debt.45
When considering the reserved rights issue, the courts are faced with
an issue involving equity, which in turn involves the following line of
deduction and a primary question. A Tribe has reserved to it those water
resources required for its present and future uses. Equating "practicably
irrigable acreage" with "economic feasibility," the courts seek a measure
which might demonstrate whether future uses are reasonable by determining whether a reasonable individual might, at any future time, invest
the funds required to achieve such uses. This demonstration requires the
use of a discount rate. In terms of equity, what discount rate should the
Court allow?
In Arizona v. California, the Special Master accepted the "standard"
discount rate used by agencies of the federal government, around seven
percent at that time.' Testimony was not seemingly presented pointing
41. Howe, The Social Discount Rate, 18 J. Environmental Economics and Management, Part 2,
S-I through S-2 (1990).
42. Lind, Reassessing the Government'sDiscount Rate Policy in Light of New Theory and Data
in a World Economy with a High Degree of Capital Mobility, 18 J. Environmental Economics and
Management, Part 2, S-3 through S-7 (1990).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Burness, Cummings, Gorman, & Lansford, PracticablyIrrigableAcreage and Economic
Feasibility:The Role of Time, Ethics, and Discounting, 23 Nat. Res. J., 289 (1983). It is generally
recognized amongst economists that this rate, which is a nominal rate of interest, is inappropriate
for use in benefit cost analyses which (as they almost always do) use constant prices for valuing
benefits and costs. If real, inflation free, prices are used in the analysis, a real, inflation free, discount
rate must be used. Id.
46. Report of E. Tuttle, Special Master, at 167, Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 601. E. Tuttle,
supra note 34 at 167. For further discussions of the economic implications of Tuttle's opinion, see
id. and Burness, Cummings, Gorman, & Lansford, The "New" Arizona v. California:Practicably
IrrigableAcreage and Economic Feasibility,22 Nat. Res. J. 517 (1982).
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to the inappropriate purposes for which this rate was used: a measure of
a real discount rate. Nor is it clear that the Special Master was apprised
of the issues underlying the paradigm of discounting which were directly
relevant to the equity issue facing him.47 A social time preference rate
must reflect a society's valuation of opportunity costs.' A discountsocial time preference-rate can be estimated only if there is agreement
as to which "society" is to value opportunity costs.49
To give some perspective to this issue, if the "society" relevant for
the Court's deliberations is the United States as a whole, then the opportunity costs as valued by the body politic in the United States is
relevant. As noted above, a rate between two percent and ten percent
might be considered an "appropriate" measure of that society's real opportunity costs. Suppose, however, that the society relevant for the Court's
deliberations is the reservation society, or the Tribe. Such a supposition
might seem warranted by the language of treaties between the United
States and these Tribes which express respect for the Indians' wish to
preserve their culture and values." Under this supposition, it is the valuation of opportunity costs by the Indian society which is relevant for
the choice of a discount rate, and its value is obtained in the same way
that we estimate such values for the United States: by looking at values
foregone from investment. If the courts find that equity considerations
dictate the valuation of opportunity costs as such values are held by the
Indian society, differing cultural and Valuation systems will no doubt
manifest themselves in different discount rates. For example, one may
find that a Tribe continually uses its own funds to repurchase lands that
once belonged to the reservation, but which passed out of trust status
largely due to the General Allotment Act.5' With the most generous assumptions as to future earnings from the purchased lands, the undiscounted value of these earnings are much less than the cost of the land.
Thus, the implied social rate of time preference-the rate implied by
actual investment patterns of the Tribe-would be zero or negative.
The "bad" economics-"bad" law point at issue here is therefore a bit
different from, and perhaps a bit more subtle than, the point discussed
above in section 2. Here we have the potential for the courts' use of
47. E. Tuttle, Special Master, at 164-168, Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 601.
48. A. Dasgupta and D. Pearce supra note 29.
49. See Cummings, The ContemporarySettingfor Water Management in the West: An Overview,
21 Water Resources Res. (1985).
50. This argument is weakened, of course, if one wishes to interpret congressional approval of
treaties as implying a congressional intent to encourage the absorption of the Indians into the white
man's society.
51. General Allotment Act, 49th Cong., Sess. II, Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). This act had the
effect of allowing individual Indian families on reservations to sell their allocated lands to non-Tribal
buyers.
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"bad" economics. This potential is realized when the courts uncritically
accept the economists' choice of a discount rate. This choice involves a
judgment about values, cultures, and equity and is part and parcel of the
substance of issues which the courts are to decide: Whose values are to
be relevant for the social time preference rate to be used in discounting?
Obviously, "bad law" can result from the court's efforts to resolve issues
involving intergenerational equity if its tools are economic methods which
embody assumptions which implicitly "resolve" these issues.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is clear that economics can and should play an important role in the
formulation and implementation of water resources management and development plans. The basic various paradigms of the economist can be
most useful in suggesting means by which the generation of incomes
from water developments can be enhanced by such things as direct and
indirect pricing mechanisms. The essential substance of economic analyses-tradeoffs-is typically central to the problems facing Congress,
the court, or the water manager.
The point made here is simply that courts, the Congress, and resource
administrators cannot accept the paradigms of economics uncritically. It
is most important that they understand the assumptions underlying the
paradigm, as those assumptions might relate directly to issues of primary
concern to them. This is to say that the economist's paradigms may not
be considered to be "objective," in the sense of being free of values.
The essence of this argument, and something of a summary of the arguments developed above is given by the following:
If the law is to use economic measures for its ends, the courts must
clearly understand the equity implications of alternative structures
...
for economic analyses. The courts must do what the economist
cannot: determine the structure of economic feasibility analyses that
squares
most closely with the courts' concern with fairness and eq52
uity.

52. H. Burness, supra note 45, at 291.

